Aquí está la entrevista que le hacen buscando las causas de la crisis en Mayo de 2010, una condensación de sus perlas de siempre. Simple, llano y al grano.

MR. BONDI: As I mentioned at the outset, we’re 
investigating the causes of the financial crisis. And

I would like to get your opinion as to whether credit

investigating the causes of the financial crisis. And
I would like to get your opinion as to whether credit
ratings and their apparent failure to predict accurately
credit quality of structured finance products, like
residential mortgage-backed securities and
collateralized debt obligations, did that failure, or
apparent failure, cause or contribute to the financial
crisis?
MR. BUFFETT: It didn’t cause it, but there
were a vast number of things that contributed to it.
The basic cause, you know, embedded in psychology
partly in psychology and partly in reality in a growing
and finally pervasive belief that house prices couldn’t
go down and everyone succumbed - virtually everybody
succumbed to that. But that’s the only way you get
a bubble is when basically a very high percentage of
the population buys into some originally sound premise
and it’s quite interesting how that develops
originally sound premise that becomes distorted as time
passes and people forget the original sound premise and
start focusing solely on the price action.
So every –the media investors, the mortgage
bankers, the American public, me, my neighbor, rating
agencies, Congress –- you name it -–people
overwhelmingly came to believe that house prices could
not fall significantly. And since it was biggest asset
class in the country and it was the easiest class to
borrow against, it created probably the biggest bubble
in our history.
It will be a bubble that will be remembered
along with the South Sea bubble and the tulip-bulb
bubble.