Lindsell Train

Global Equity Fund

ALL DATA AS OF 31 JANUARY 2024 — MONTHLY REPORT | FACTSHEET

Fund Objective & Policy

To increase the value of Shareholders' capital over the longer term from a focused, actively managed portfolio of global equities, primarily those listed or traded on Recognised Exchanges in developed countries world-wide. The Fund's investment performance is compared with the MSCI World Index and is reported in Sterling. The fund is not constrained by the benchmark (MSCI World Index) and will take positions in individual stocks that differ significantly from the Index with the aim of achieving a return in excess of the benchmark.

There is no guarantee that a positive return will be delivered.

Calendar Year Total Return Performance (%) £

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Global Equity Fund (B Dist.)	+19.4	+11.7	+0.6	-4.4	+6.3
MSCI World Index	+22.7	+12.3	+22.9	-7.8	+16.8
Relative Return	**-3.3**	**-0.6**	**-22.3**	**+3.4**	**-10.5**

Total Return Performance to 31st January 2024 (%) £

					Annualised			
	1m	3m	YTD	1yr	3yr	5yr	10yr	Since Launch
Global Equity Fund (B Dist.)	+2.3	+8.5	+2.3	+6.1	+2.1	+6.2	+12.7	+13.1
MSCI World Index	+1.3	+10.7	+1.3	+13.1	+10.8	+12.1	+12.0	+11.5
Relative Return	**+1.0**	**-2.2**	**+1.0**	**-7.0**	**-8.7**	**-5.9**	**+0.7**	**+1.6**

Source: Morningstar Direct. Fund performance is based on B Dist. Class shares. Total return is provided net of fees with dividends reinvested. For periods greater than one year, returns are shown annualised.

Past performance is not a guide to future performance.

Fund Information

Type of Scheme	Dublin OEIC (UCITS)
Launch Date	16 March 2011
Classes	A Dist., B Dist., B, D Dist. (£), C (US$) & E (€)
Base Currency	GBP (£)
Benchmark	MSCI World Index
Dealing & Valuation	12 noon each Dublin & UK Business Day
Year End	31 December
Dividend XD Dates	1 January, 1 July
Pay Dates	31 January, 31 July

Fund Assets

£4,574m

Share Price

A Dist.	£3.7046
B Dist.	£4.2730
B	£1.0890
C	$2.3388
D Dist.	£2.9180
E	€1.5870

Source: Lindsell Train Limited and Link Fund Administrators (Ireland) Limited.

Fund Profile

The portfolio is concentrated, with the number of stocks ranging from 20-35, and has low turnover.

Portfolio Managers

James Bullock
Michael Lindsell
Nick Train

Investment Manager & Distributor

Lindsell Train Ltd,
66 Buckingham Gate,
London,
SW1E 6AU

Tel: +44 (0) 20 7808 1210
info@lindselltrain.com

Manager

Waystone Management Company (IE) Limited

Regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland

Top 10 Holdings (% NAV)

Nintendo	9.69
London Stock Exchange Group	9.04
RELX	8.28
Diageo	7.62
Heineken Holding	5.07
Walt Disney	4.90
Intuit	4.89
Mondelez	4.89
PepsiCo	4.72
Prada	4.70

Sector Allocation (% NAV)



Consumer Staples	36.1
Communication Services	22.0
Financials	15.0
Information Technology	9.4
Industrials	8.3
Consumer Discretionary	6.7
Health Care	1.8
Cash	0.7
Total	**100.0**

Country Allocation (% NAV)



USA	35.0
UK	31.9
Japan	19.4
Europe ex-UK	13.1
Cash	0.7
Total	**100.0**

Allocation and holdings subject to change

Share Class Information

	Minimum Investment	Management Fees	Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF)*	ISIN	Sedol
A Dist.	£1,500	1.10% p.a.	1.16% p.a.	IE00B644PG05	B644PG0
B Dist.	£150,000	0.60% p.a.	0.66% p.a.	IE00B3NS4D25	B3NS4D2
B	£150,000	0.60% p.a	0.66% p.a.	IE00051RD3C4	BP2P6W1
C	$250,000	0.60% p.a.	0.66% p.a.	IE00BK4Z4V95	BK4Z4V9
D Dist.	£200m	0.45% p.a.	0.51% p.a.	IE00BJSPMJ28	BJSPMJ2
E	€100,000	0.60% p.a.	0.66% p.a.	IE00BF2VFW20	BF2VFW2

*The OCF is a measure of the Fund's total operating expenses over 12 months, including management fee, as a percentage of the Fund's net assets. The OCF is based on expenses and average assets for the year ending 31 December 2022. It is calculated by the Fund Administrator and published in the KIID dated 17/02/2023. It is an indication of the likely level of costs and will fluctuate as the Fund's expenses and average net assets change. The OCF excludes any portfolio transaction costs. A copy of the latest prospectus and the Key Investor Information Document for each class is available from www.lindselltrain.com

Contacts

Company/Fund Registered Office
Lindsell Train Global Funds plc,
33 Sir John Rogerson's Quay,
Dublin, Ireland

Depositary & Custodian
The Bank of New York
Mellon SA/NV

Regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland

Fund Administrator,
Dealing & Registration
Link Fund Administrators
(Ireland) Limited

Tel: +353 1 400 5300
Fax: +353 1 400 5350
Email: dublinTA@linkgroup.ie

1st Floor, 2 Grand Canal Square,
Grand Canal Harbour, Dublin, Ireland
Regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland

Board of Directors
Alex Hammond-Chambers
Claire Cawley
David Dillon
Lesley Williams
Keith Wilson

Please refer to Lindsell Train's Glossary of Investment terms here.

Investment Team Comments

We invest in our strategies alongside you, focusing our effort and energy on building what we hope is an acceptable long-term record. Regrettably, last year was a disappointing one for us and our investors and we clearly aspire to better.

But how to remedy this? Our long-term approach means today's performance stems from decisions taken five, perhaps 10 years ago. Similarly, current decisions aim to add value over the next decade, not alleviate present woes. Quick fixes can hamstring the long-term compounding we seek, and our preference when in doubt is to resist the temptation to act. Personally, I assign more weight to our initial analysis (typically years' worth of company research) than to knee jerk reaction. And so, we not only bias towards inaction, but when issues arise, value the time to think. Exiting early from a long-term compounder has structural consequences and where possible, we will spend days, months, or even years, assessing the severity of a problem.

Still, activity can be rational, even within an explicitly low-turnover portfolio. All companies will face trials and our response to these can drastically shape future returns. Some challenges are external and fleeting, others cut deeper, last longer, and prove permanent. For the disciplined, the first are an opportunity to add on weakness. The second implies either a mistaken hypothesis or a material negative change and should also be acted upon, with the holding replaced by a stronger candidate from the bench. As Charlie Munger once said, 'success means being very patient, but aggressive when it's time'.

Looking back to 2020 and 2022, after much deliberation, we concluded that Canon, Meiko Network and Pearson faced prospects either changed or diminished versus our initial thesis, and each was sold to make space for new or upweighted existing positions.

However, whilst debating the pros and cons of a company on-watch, 'Mr Market' sometimes surprises us with a generous offer for the equity. In such instances we will consider selling, with the high exit price helping to mitigate the classic risk of needlessly buying high/selling low. In this vein, we can now report, for the first time in almost two years, a change to the portfolio as we exit our longstanding holding in the Japanese Exchange Group (JPX) to build a new position in Universal Music Group (UMG).

JPX is a high-quality business with a regulator-supported, near-monopoly position across equity, derivative, and commodity trading in Japan. Its dominance earns the exchange high and stable operating margins (exceeding 49% every year since 2015) and proxy participation in rising local markets. We have owned it in the Global Equity Fund since inception, enjoying a healthy 17.2% annualised total return over almost-13 years in Sterling, ranking JPX as one of the strategy's best performers. It's not been a smooth line. Big chunks of return were delivered in 2013-15 as the Osaka Securities Exchange (our original holding) combined with the Tokyo Stock Exchange unlocking major efficiencies; in 2020 as lockdowns spurred a boom in retail trading activity; and 2023-24 as the surging Japanese market boosts volumes and trading revenues.

This is not a struggling business. Far from it. But we have for some time questioned the sustainability of its recent trajectory. Ultimately, we're looking for durable growth, directed by deep-moated companies that go out and make their own luck. The large boost to earnings unlocked by the Osaka-Tokyo merger was triumphal, but also a one-time event. With over 80% of Japanese equities trading and clearing already in-house, future consolidation will necessarily involve overseas partners. But exchanges are typically seen as strategic national assets with cross-border deals difficult to execute (note three failed attempts in 2011 alone!). Beyond this, JPX has abstained from M&A in other verticals (such as index or data services, perhaps with their hands tied by a conservative regulator), meaning trading and clearing revenues remain key at c.60% of the total. As a result, JPX's growth largely rests on the level of and activity within the wider Japanese stock market. Over the very long term we assume such major developed markets will continue to rise, creating real value for equity holders. However, even on 20-to-30-year horizons, extreme cyclicality has overlain this rewarding trend. The TOPIX today is roughly three times its price in 2011 when we initiated our JPX position and another swing back to anywhere near these levels could be an unpleasant experience for holders of the exchange's shares. Further out, there are other, more structural headwinds to consider. If trading liquidity continues to pool globally, and if Asia's financial centre of gravity shifts further in China's direction, JPX could eventually suffer.

Over our holding period, price-to-earnings (PE) multiple expansion, a welcome but unreliable phenomenon, has made a significant contribution to performance. JPX's PE and enterprise value-to-revenue multiples have more than doubled from c.12x and c.4x respectively in 2011, to c.30x and c.10x today, putting them at or near all-time highs. JPX remains a long-term holding in our Japan Strategy; however, in a global context and at these prices, we have looked for other opportunities.

Fortunately, such opportunities exist within our well stocked global investment universe. UMG stands out for its similarly impressive oligopolistic position, which to UMG's credit is more obviously global. As the world's leading music company, built through generations of consolidation (MCA and Decca, arguably UMG's key predecessors, were founded

Continued...

Please refer to Lindsell Train's Glossary of Investment terms here.

Investment Team Comments

in 1924 and 1929 respectively), UMG supplies roughly a third of the planet's recorded music (ahead of the other two 'majors' Sony and Warner), curating, producing, and promoting artists. On top of this, as a publisher, UMG holds nearly a quarter of humanity's written songs. Spun out from Vivendi as an independent listed entity in 2021, backed by strategic shareholders such as Tencent, the shares have spent two years languishing. Despite a torrent of good news, at the point of our initiation they still traded below their 2021 IPO price. Of course, this may simply reflect over-optimism at float, but FY23's expected sales and operating profit are now already c.50% higher than in FY19, taking UMG's current multiple to a more reasonable level.

Music is ingrained and integral to the daily life of swathes of humanity, with engagement levels rising as new distribution modes widen access. Monetisation (not consumption) has eluded the industry at times in the past, but these issues appear well resolved by the ubiquity of subscription streaming, with new markets such as video games and social media rapidly emerging. As core content owners and market leaders (note the importance of this dominance, given that globally, the top 1% of artists represent 90% of music streams) UMG holds a uniquely strong hand. If management can capitalise on these tailwinds and execute on analyst expectations for growth, we hope this will prove an attractive entry point.

James Bullock, 8th February 2024

Source: Lindsell Train, Morningstar & Bloomberg; as of 31st January 2024

Note: All stock returns are in local currency unless otherwise specified.

The top three absolute contributors to the Fund's performance in January were Nintendo, RELX and Prada, and the top three absolute detractors were London Stock Exchange Group, Shiseido and Juventus Football Club.

Important Information

This document is for information only and is not to be construed as a solicitation, recommendation or an offer to buy or sell any security, fund or financial instrument. This document is a marketing communication and has no regard for the specific investment objectives, financial situation or needs of any specific investor. This is not a contractually binding document. If in doubt, investors should seek advice from a financial advisor prior to investing. Any decision to invest should be based on information contained within the prospectus of the Fund, the Key Investor Information Documents (KIIDs) and the latest report and accounts. No investment decision should be based on this communication alone. Any references to specific securities are for the purposes of illustration only. Fund performance data is calculated net of fees with income reinvested unless stated otherwise. All performance and income data is in relation to the stated share class, performance of other share classes may differ. The dividend yield is not guaranteed and will fluctuate. There is no guarantee that the fund will achieve its objectives. Tax legislation and the levels of relief from taxation can change at any time. Any change in the tax status of a Fund or in tax legislation could affect the value of the investments held by the Fund or its ability to provide returns to its investors. The tax treatment of an investment, and any dividends received, will depend on the individual circumstances of the investor and may be subject to change in the future.

Past performance is not a guide or guarantee to future performance. Investments carry a degree of risk and the value of investments and any income from them may go down as well as up and you may not get back the amount you originally invested. Investments may be affected by movements in currency fluctuations. All references to benchmarks are for information purposes only. To the extent that the portfolio invests a relatively high percentage of its assets in securities of a limited number of companies, and also invests in securities with a particular industry, sector or geographical focus, they may be more susceptible than a more diversified portfolio to large swings (both up and down) in their value. Furthermore, the concentrated nature of the portfolio leads to relatively significant holdings in individual securities which can have an adverse effect on the ability to sell these securities when the Investment Manager deems it appropriate and on the price of these securities achieved by the Investment Manager at the time of sale.

The Lindsell Train Global Funds plc – Global Equity Fund (the "Fund") is a UCITS open ended investment company authorised in Ireland by the Central Bank of Ireland and is a scheme recognised by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

This Fund is not registered under the Securities Act 1933 or the Investment Company Act 1940 of the United States of America ("USA") and is therefore not for distribution to any US persons or to any other person in the USA. This Fund is not registered with the Securities & Futures Commission in Hong Kong and accordingly the distribution of this document is restricted. Opinions expressed whether specifically, or in general, or both on the performance of individual securities and in a wider economic context represent the view of Lindsell Train Limited at the time of preparation. They are subject to change and should not be interpreted as investment advice. Although Lindsell Train Limited considers the information included in this document to be reliable, no warranty is given to its accuracy or completeness. The information provided in this document was captured on the date indicated and therefore is not current. Current prices and the latest copy of the Prospectus can be obtained from Lindsell Train Limited or the Fund Administrator. No part of this document may be copied, reproduced or distributed to any other person without prior express written consent from Lindsell Train Limited.

Notice to Swiss investors: This is an advertising document. Neither the Company nor any Sub-Fund has been authorised by or registered with the FINMA and may not be advertised or offered in Switzerland to non-qualified investors. The Sub-Funds have not appointed a representative and a paying agent in Switzerland. Therefore, the Sub-Funds and Shares may only be advertised and/or offered to qualified investors within the meaning of art. 10 para. 3 and 3ter Collective Investment Schemes Act ("CISA"), which are institutional clients or per-se professional clients within the meaning of art. 4 para. 3 and 4 and art. 5 para. 4 of the Swiss Financial Services Act ("FINSA"). The Sub-Funds and the Shares may not be advertised, offered, recommended or otherwise made available to private clients within the meaning of the FINSA in Switzerland, including high net worth private clients and private investment structures established for them (opting-out) pursuant to art. 5 para. 1 FINSA except under an asset/portfolio management or investment advisory relationship entered into with a regulated financial institution pursuant to and in accordance with art. 10 para. 3ter CISA and art. 129a of the Swiss Collective Investment Schemes Ordinance."

Issued and approved by Lindsell Train Limited 66 Buckingham Gate, London, SW1E 6AU (registered office in England & Wales No.03941727). Authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FRN:194229)